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may be able by manipulation of the concept of "position of peril,"
to confine the operation of the doctrine within socially desirable
bounds.
ALVIN M. EXTEIN.
RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY AND TRANSFEREE AS AFFECTED
BY ASSIGNMENT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
When the person who contracted for insurance on his own life
assigns the contract to another, the rights of the assignee are
essentially dependent upon and interwoven with the rights of
the beneficiary and of the person who took out the policy. Partly
because of this fact, and partly because the courts have dealt
more fully with problems of change of beneficiary than with
problems of assignment, the first part of this paper will be de-
voted to a consideration of the rights of a beneficiary in the
event of an attempted change of beneficiary. This background
is necessary in order to consider later the effect of an assignment.
In dealing with cases involving life insurance contracts, courts
frequently speak of the "insured." In the case of insurance pro-
cured by a person upon his own life, payable to another, however,
both the applicant and the named beneficiary may be said to be
"insured." For purpose of differentiation, the designation cestui
que vie will be applied to the person upon whose life the policy
is issued. The person to whom the proceeds of the policy are to
be paid will be called the beneficiary. An assignment may be
made in a state other than the place of application for the policy
or the home office of the company, thereby raising problems of
the proper choice of law to govern the transaction. Neither prob-
lems of conflict of laws nor problems of assignment for collateral
security will be considered here.'
The first English life insurance policies apparently contained
no clause reserving the right to change the beneficiary. That
not widen the zone of peril very far. It may not work so well in the case of
2 equally speedy vehicles like automobiles which run anywhere in the street,
with a wide zone of peril because of the speed of many feet (or yards) per
second which obliviousness could widen to more than 100 feet * * * What-
ever may be the ultimate solution for the new strain placed upon the fair
and just operation of our humanitarian doctrine by modern fast-moving
traffic, the question cannot be answered here."
1. Although some of the assignments in cases cited hereafter were made
for purposes of collateral security, those cases are here cited for their
treatment of general assignment problems rather than for their treatment
of other phases of assignment for collateral security.
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this policy form was carried over into early American law is
evident from the many reported cases involving such policies.
Its adoption was probably due to a number of factors: the his-
torical dependency of American law on English precedent, the
evolution of the third party beneficiary contract, and the rising
tendency to protect the family by giving a married woman statu-
tory power to contract for insurance on the life of her husband.
When the insurance contract does not reserve a right to change
the beneficiary, courts have held uniformly that the beneficiary
takes a vested interest which is not subject to change without
his express consent.2 The interest vests in him from the time of
"delivery" of the policy as that term has been variously defined
by the courts.3 In connection with contracts in which no power is
reserved to change the beneficiary, no problem of assignment
arises except from the assignment by the beneficiary of his own
interest. But by the terms of such a policy, the cestui que vie
who applies for the insurance may reserve to himself certain
conversion rights, or the right to control of the proceeds upon
the prior death of the named beneficiary. An assignment of the
policy by the cestui que vie under these circumstances passes
only those rights expressly reserved by him.4
It later became common practice to insert a "reservation of
right" clause in the policy reserving the power to change the
designation of the beneficiary in a case where the cestui que vie
was the applicant. Only this type of policy will be considered in
this paper.
The rights of the cestui que vie and of the beneficiary are
determined by the contract of insurance, and the interest of the
cestui que vie is limited by rights existing in the designated
beneficiary. The rights of the assignee are necessarily derivative
from the assignor. Consequently, when the cestui que vie at-
tempts to transfer the insurance policy, the effective creation of
rights in the assignee depends on the nature of the beneficiary's
interest in the policy. It therefore becomes necessary to observe
2. Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) Sec. 144, 145, pp. 541-551. Wisconsin
formerly held contra, but this has been changed by statute. Wis. Stats.
(1937) Ch. 246, sec. 246.09 and see Christman v. Christman (1916) 163
Wis. 433, 157 N. W. 1099.
3. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198.
4. Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at sec. 147, p. 566; Hubbard v. Stapp
(1889) 32 Ill. App. 541; Pierce v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. (1884) 138
Mass. 151; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Calif. State Bank (1919) 202 Mo.
App. 347, 216 S. W. 785; St. John v. Am. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1855) 13
N. Y. 31, 64 Am. Dec. 529; Alday v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. (Ga. 1939) 5
S. E. (2d) 707.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/14
the nature of the beneficiary's interest in the light of various
attempts to affect that interest. From these observations, analo-
gies may be drawn to aid in the treatment of certain problems
in the less settled field of assignment.
By compliance with formal procedure for changing the bene-
ficiary under the reservation of right clause, the cestui que vie
may at any time transfer the potential receipt of benefit under
the policy from one beneficiary to another, without the consent
of the former.5 This procedure, in general, consists of giving to
the company a written notice, accompanied by the policy for in-
dorsement; the change takes effect at the time of indorsement
but in certain circumstances may be held to relate back to the
act of the cestui que vie.6 With the advent of this clause it be-
came necessary for courts to reexamine the interest of the bene-
ficiary. Some courts, influenced by prior decisions, held that the
beneficiary still had a vested interest in the proceeds of the policy,
but that the reservation of right clause made this vested interest
subject to divestment. Other courts decided that under such a
clause the interest of a beneficiary did not come into existence
until the cestui que vie died without having effected a change of
beneficiary.
Various interpretations have been made by different courts in
defining the nature of the beneficiary's interest under a policy
containing a reservation of right clause. Thus, it has been de-
nominated "vested subject to being divested," "vested subject to
a condition," "conditional," "contingent," an "expectancy" and a
"mere shadowy interest." Further, several terms of varying
connotation seem to be used synonymously in the course of
5. Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at sec. 147, p. 566; Potter v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ia. 1933) 247 N. W. 669; Toussant v. Nat. Life &
Accident Ins. Co. (1920) 147 La. 977, 86 So. 415; Davis v. Modern Indus-
trial Bank (N. Y. 1939) 18 N. E. (2d) 639; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Olsen
(1923) 81 N. H. 143, 123 Atl. 576.
6. There are several reasons for such relation back. In some instances
equity will uphold the charge where compliance with formalities was be-
yond control of the party attempting to effect the transfer. For a discussion
of the points see infra page 526.
The reservation of right clause contained in some policies requires that
consent of the insurer be given to the change, and that this consent be
shown by the indorsement on the policy. In these circumstances indorse-
ment is a discretionary act. See generally, in this connection, E. M. Gross-
man, Problems of the Insurer when Attempted Change of Beneficiary Is
Incomplete, Assoc. of Life Ins. Counsel Papers, Dec. 6, 1932, 413, 443.
7. See Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at sec. 147, p. 562. See also Johnson
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1914) 56 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 414; Freund v. Freund
(1905) 218 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925; and Neary v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1918)
92 Conn. 488, 103 Atl. 661.
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a single opinion.8 The only profitable inquiry must therefore in-
volve the nature of the interest in the beneficiary which courts
have recognized, rather than the labels which they apply.
Many jurisdictions hold that, under an attempt to transfer
beneficial rights to another, the prior named beneficiary has such
interest that he may require at least substantial compliance with
provisions of the reservation of right clause.9 Drawing an anal-
ogy to, and in some instances even citing as precedent, the cases
upholding as indefeasibly vested the interest of a beneficiary
under a policy without such clause,10 these courts view the reser-
vation of right clause as an encroachment on what was formerly
recognized as a vested interest, and construe it strictly. They
regard compliance with formalities of the clause as a condition
precedent to the divesting of the beneficial interest.1 Under this
view, the formalities are for the protection of the beneficiary,1 2
and the insurance company cannot, by waiver of compliance,
divest his interest.
3
A number of jurisdictions, however, regard the interest of the
beneficiary as insufficient to enable him to require substantial
compliance with provisions of the policy regarding change of
8. See, for example, the dissent in Neary v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1918)
92 Conn. 488, 103 Atl. 661, which uses most of these terms.
9. Johnson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1914) 56 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 414;
Met. Life Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell (1917) 11 Del. Chanc. 404, 102 At]. 163;
Sheppard v. Crowley (1911) 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 841; Freund v. Freund
(1905) 218 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925; Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis
(1913) 180 Ind. 9, 101 N. E. 289; Ehlermann v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co.
(1924) 199 Ia. 417, 200 N. W. 408; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Murtagh et al.
(1915) 137 La. 760, 69 So. 165; Kockanek v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. (1928)
262 Mass. 174, 159 N. E. 520; McKinney v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.(1917) 270 Mo. 305, 193 S. W. 564; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Tesauro (1923)
94 N. J. Eq. 637, 120 Atl. 918; City Nat'l Bank v. Lewis et. al. (1918) 73
Okla. 329, 176 Pac. 237; Gannon v. Gannon (1926) 88 Pa. Super. Ct. 239;
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bedford et. al. (1914) 36 R. I. 116, 89
Atl. 154; Wannamaker v. Stroman (1932) 167 S. C. 484, 166 S. E. 621 (the
court apparently has returned to the requirement of substantial compliance
after a period of uncertainty); Cronbach v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (Tenn.
1928) 284 S. W. 72; Christman v. Christman (1916) 163 Wis. 433, 157
N. W. 1099.
10. Neary v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 488, 103 Atl. 661.
11. Johnson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1914) 56 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 414;
Ehlerman v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (1924) 199 Ia. 417, 200 N. W. 408; and
,cases cited supra note 9.
12. Hurst v. Mut. Res. Fund Life Ins. Co. (1893) 78 Md. 59, 26 Atl. 956;
Cockrill v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. (Tex. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 399;
Sullivan v. Maroney (1910) 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 At]. 150.
13. Slurzberg v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. (N. J. 1936) 192 At]. 451;
Douglass v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc. (1922) 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834; Wilkie
v. Phila. Life Ins. Co. (S. C. 1938) 197 S. E. 375; Hotel-Men's Mut. Ben.
Ass'n v. Brown (1887) 33 Fed. 11; Muller v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.(1916) 62 Colo. 245, 161 Pac. 148.
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beneficiary before his rights under the policy are extinguished.1 4
These courts are agreed that prior to the death of the cestui que
vie the beneficial interest has no concrete form, and that pro-
visions of the clause are for the benefit of the company and so
may be waived by it ;15 these courts, however, are not in accord
as to the time or method of such waiver.
Thus, some courts hold that upon death of the cestui que vie
the beneficial interest vests absolutely in the person recognized as
beneficiary by the company at that time; any act relied on as
a waiver must have taken place prior to that time.' 6 Other courts
of this group permit the company to effectuate many acts of the
cesti quc vie from which the intent may be inferred as sufficient
to effect a change of beneficiary,17 although these acts do not
amount to substantial compliance. This is on the ground that the
cesti qze vie should be permitted to change the beneficiary at
any time until the very moment of his death, and that to require
notice of such desire to be communicated to the company in time
to permit a recognition of the change before death would de-
prive the cestti que vie of a part of his contract rights.'8 Upon
this basis, an insurer may waive compliance with the formalities
even after death of the cestui que vie. Such waiver is said to be
14. Mente v. Townsend (1900) 68 Ark. 391, 59 S. W. 41; Morrison v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1940 Cal.) 103 P. (2d) 963; Rattray v. Banks (1924)
31 Ga. App. 589, 121 S. E. 516; Daugherty v. Daugherty et. al. (1913) 152
Ky. 732, 154 S. W. 9; Atl. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gannon et. al. (1901) 179
Mass. 291, 60 N. E. 933; Hooton v. Hooton et. al. (1925) 230 Mich. 689,
203 N. W. 475; Hogue v. Minn. Packing Co. (1894) 59 Minn. 39, 60 N. W.
812; Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Moody (1920) 122 Miss. 99, 84 So. 135; LaBorde
v. Farmers' State Bank (1927) 116 Neb. 33, 215 N. W. 559; White v. White
(1922 N. Y.) 194 N. Y. S. 114; Atkinson v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 114
Ohio St. 109, 150 N. E. 748; McNeill v. Chinn (1907) 45 Tex. Civ. App.
551, 101 S. W. 465.
15. Taylor v. Southern Bank & Trust Co. (1933) 227 Ala. 565, 151 So.
357; Daugherty v. Daugherty et. al. (1913) 152 Ky. 732, 154 S. W. 9;
Smith v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Neb. 1936) 265 N. W. 534; See also cases
cited supra note 14.
16. Clark v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 126 Me. 7, 135 Atl. 357; Strianese
v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. 1927) 221 App. Div. 81, 223 N. Y. S. 16; Berg
v. Damkoehler (1902) 112 Wise. 587, 88 N. W. 606; Colonial Trust Co. v.
Scranton Life Ins. Co. (1921) 30 Pa. Dist. R. 954; Carson v. Carson (Okla.
1933) 26 P. (2d) 739.
17. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. White (1898) 20 R. I. 457, 40
Atl. 5; Martinelli v. Cometti et. al. (1929) 133 Misc. (N. Y.) 810, 234 N. Y.
S. 389; In re Hills (1924) 123 Misc. (N. Y.) 762, 206 N. Y. S. 220;
Daugherty v. Daugherty et. al. (1913) 152 Ky. 732, 154 S. W. 9; Bank of
Belzoni v. Hodges et. al. (1923) 132 Miss. 238, 96 So. 97; LaBorde v.
Farmer's State Bank (Neb. 1927) 116 Neb. 33, 215 N. W. 559; Atkinson v.
Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N. E. 748.
18. Atkinson v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N. E. 748.
19411 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
526 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 26
evidenced by a payment to the substituted beneficiary,", or by
the filing of a bill of interpleader in a contest between: persons
claiming the beneficial interest.20
Strictest compliance with the formalities for changing the
beneficiary is not required by courts of either group, and equity
will uphold the change if the cause of variance is beyond control
of the party attempting to effect the transfer of beneficial in-
terest.2' Thus, if the original beneficiary is in possession of the
policy and refuses to surrender it, presentation of the policy to
the company for indorsement will not be required.22 If the cestui
que vie takes effective steps for a change of beneficiary but dies
before indorsement of the policy by an officer of the company, the
change will be regarded as complete if the indorsement be con-
sidered a mere ministerial act.2 3 Where, however, by the court's
interpretation of the clause, consent of the company to the trans-
fer is discretionary, equity will not enforce the change.24 Equita-
ble enforcement of an attempted change of beneficiary operates
independently of any waiver of compliance with formalities by
the company, and so is effective in those jurisdictions which hold
that compliance with formalities is a condition precedent to af-
fecting the beneficiary's interest, as well as in those states which
hold such compliance to be for the benefit of the insurer.
19. In re Hills (1924) 123 Misc. (N. Y.) 762, 206 N. Y. S. 220; Allis
v. Ware (1881) 28 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 666; Norfolk Nat'l Bank v. Flynn
(1899) 58 Neb. 253, 78 N. W. 505; Gosling v. Caldwell (1878) 1 Lea.
(Tenn.) 454, 27 Am. Rep. 774.
20. McDonald v. McDonald (Ala. 1924) 102 So. 38; Daugherty v. Daugh-
erty et. al. (1913) 152 Ky. 732, 154 S. W. 9; Bank of Belzoni v. Hodges
et. al. (1923) 132 Miss. 238, 96 So. 97; Atkinson v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926)
114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N. E. 748.
21. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Rose et. al. (1924) 70 Cal. App. 175, 233 Pac.
343; Gannon v. Gannon (1926) 88 Pa. Super. Ct. 239; Quist v. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. (1922) 219 Mich. 406, 189 N. W. 49; Hoskins v.
Hoskins (1929) 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029; Teague v. Pilot Life Ins.
Co. (1931) 200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421.
22. John Hancock Mut. Co. v. Bedford et. al. (1914) 36 R. 1. 116, 89 Atl.
154; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Rose et. al. (1924) 70 Cal. App. 175, 233 Pac.
343; Kavanagh v. New Engl. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1925) 238 Ill. App. 72;
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cook et. al. (1927) 237 Mich. 303, 211 N. W. 648;
Aherns v. First Nat'l Life, H. & A. Ins. Co. (1927) 6 La. App. 661.
23. Wentworth v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1925) 65 Utah 581, 238
Pac. 648; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Clanton et. al. (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 4, 73 Atl.
1052; LaBorde v. Farmer's State Bank (1927) 116 Neb. 33, 215 N. W. 559;
Stewart v. Stewart (1930) 90 Ind. App. 620, 169 N. E. 593; Teague v. Pilot
Life Ins. Co. et. al. (1931) 200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421; Brown v. Home
Life Ins. Co. (1925) 3 F. (2d) 661.
24. Freund v. Freund (1905) 218 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925; Herrod v. Kim-
brough (1924) 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 238; Lewis v. Reed (1920) 48 Cal. App.
742, 192 Pac. 335; See also Sheppard v. Crowley (1911) 61 Fla. 735, 55 So.
841, based on statutory interpretation.
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Although the right of assignment by the cestui que vie and the
beneficiary of their respective interests under the policy exists
wholly apart from any contractual provisions, as a character-
istic of a non-negotiable chose in action,25 the right to change
the beneficiary does not exist in the absence of a provision in the
insurance contract. Provisions in the policy in regard to assign-
ment are generally limited to statements that the company will
not be responsible for the validity of an assignment, and that
the company will not be deemed to have had notice of the assign-
ment (for purpose of payment) until a written copy is filed at
the home office. 26 Such provisions are simply attempts on the
part of the insurer to avoid liability arising out of an assignment
transaction, and have not affected the decisions of most courts as
to the effect of an assignment on the beneficiary's interest.
The effect upon the interest of the beneficiary of various situa-
tions arising out of an assignment of the insurance policy has
not been completely considered in any jurisdiction, and less than
one-half the states have any cases on the point at all. Authority
is thus lacking for much of the following analysis, which is de-
veloped by analogy from treatment by the courts of attempts to
change the beneficiary.
An assignment of the policy transfers power to change the
beneficiary and control of the policy from the cestui que vie to
the assignee. The latter, by executing that power and by com-
plying with policy provisions for a change of beneficiary, can
transfer the interest of the former beneficiary to the assignee or
to a third party.27 This would be true even in a jurisdiction
which holds the beneficiary's interest sufficient to enable him to
compel substantial compliance with policy provisions to affect his
interest.
In most instances, the assignee does not comply with policy
provisions which would be necessary for an actual change of
beneficiary, but stops with a notification to the company of the
assignment to him. The question therefore arises whether notifi-
cation to the insurer by the assignee of the transfer of the policy
to him will have the same legal effect as if the assignee had
exercised the power vested in him by the assignment and had
25. Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at sec. 29, p. 74.
26. B. L. Holland, Assignment by Insured of policies which Reserve to
the Insured the Right to Change the Beneficiary, Assoc. of Life Ins. Counsel
Papers, May 24, 1928, 181.
27. Douglass v. Equitable Life Assur. Co. (1922) 150 La. 519, 90 So.
834; Anderson v. Broad Street Bank (1918) 90 N. J. Eq. 78, 105 Atl. 599;
Muller v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1916) 62 Colo. 245, 161 Pac. 148.
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actually effectuated a change of beneficiary. It has been pointed
out above that the meager policy provisions relating to assign-
ment have almost universally been considered by the courts as
inserted solely for the protection of the insurance company. The
answer to the question is dependent upon the view adopted by
various courts regarding the nature of the interest of the bene-
ficiary under a policy subject to a reserved power to change the
beneficiary.
In jurisdictions which require substantial compliance with
policy provisions to effect a change of beneficiary, the courts
have generally held that notice of the assignment given to the
company prior to the death of the cestui que vie is insufficient
to affect the interest of the beneficiary. 8 Substantial compliance
with policy provisions for changing the beneficiary is also re-
quired of the assignee.
In jurisdictions which are less stringent, it was noted above
that the cestui que vie is permitted to change the beneficiary in
circumstances not amounting to substantial compliance with the
reservation of right clause. As to assignment, these courts have
held that notice to the company, in the lifetime of the cestui quo
vie, of transfer of the policy will justify payment of the benefit
to the assignee. The latter is thus protected even though no
change of beneficiary was actually made.
29
28. Sullivan v. Maroney et. al. (1910) 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 Atl. 150;
Anderson v. Broad Street Bank (1918) 90 N. J. Eq. 78, 105 Atl. 599; Met.
Life Ins. Co. v. Zgliczenski (1922) 94 N. J. Eq. 300, 119 At]. 29; Johnson
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1914) 56 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 414; Muller v. Penn.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1916) 62 Colo. 245, 161 Pac. 148; Douglass v. Equita-
ble Life Assur. Co. (1922) 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834; Goldman v. Moses
(1934) 287 Mass. 393, 191 N. E. 873; Third Nat'l Bank of Lawton v. Lewis
et. al. (1918) 73 Okla. 329, 176 Pac. 237; Barner v. Lyter (1906) 31 Pa.
Super. Ct. 435; Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Fla. 1939) 189 So. 412. But
see Shay v. Merch. Banking Trust Co. (Pa. 1939) 6 Atl. (2d) 536 upholding
such an assignment as against the beneficiary. The Pa. courts have required
substantial compliance with policy provisions to change the beneficiary, and
apparently this requirement still exists. Cody v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
(Pa. 1939) 5 Atl. (2d) 887. In the Shay case the court apparently bases its
decision on the nominal difference between a change of beneficiary and an
assignment rather than on the rights of the beneficiary under an insurance
contract. Further, it is said that although the assignment is regarded as
an attempted change of beneficiary which does not comply with policy
provisions for such change, these provisions are for the benefit of the
company and are waived by interpleader.
In S. C., a somewhat similar situation is created by the changing opinion
of the court. At the present time substantial compliance is required to
change the beneficiary, but an earlier case, permitting assignment of the
policy to divest the beneficial interest, remains undisturbed. See cases cited
infra, note 29.
29. Antley v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. et. al. (1927) 139 S. C. 23, 137 S. E.
199 (overruling Barron v. Liberty Nat. Bank (1925) 131 S. C. 443, 128
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In the event that no notice of an assignment of the policy was
given to the company until after the death of the cestui que vie,
several situations are presented. Those jurisdictions which re-
gard the interest of the beneficiary as such that he may compel
substantial compliance with the reservation of right clause be-
fore his interest is affected, hold that a mere notice of the assign-
ment to the company, even before death of the cestui que vie,
will not affect the interest of the beneficiary. Clearly a notice of
assignment not given until after death would be insufficient.
On the other hand, in jurisdictions holding that the benefici-
ary's interest is insufficient for him to compel substantial com-
pliance with the reservation of right clause to affect his interest,
there are several possibilities arising out of notice of an assign-
ment of the policy given to the company after the death of the
cestui que vie. If the company pays the original beneficiary be-
fore receiving notice of the assignment, its liability under the
policy will be discharged, because under the terms of the policy,
the insurer does not have to recognize an assignment until it
has received notice thereof. The policy provisions relative to
assignment here operate to protect the insurer.
In the event of notice of assignment after death but before
payment, however, it would seem that even the courts which hold
the beneficiary's interest insufficient to compel substantial com-
pliance will divide according to their conception of the time at
which the beneficial interest finally becomes absolutely vested.
Thus, it is to be expected that those courts of this group which
hold that the interest vests in that person recognized by the
company as beneficiary at the moment of death of the cestui
que vie will hold that notice received thereafter cannot affect
that interest. In this situation, the insurer will not be permitted
S. E. 414, contra); Farmer's State Bank v. Kelley (1923) 155 Ga. 733,
118 S. E. 197; Merchants' Bank et. al. v. Garrard (1924) 158 Ga. 867, 124
S. E. 715; Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Moody (1920) 122 Miss. 99, 84 So. 135;
Bank of Belzoni -. Hodges et. al. (1923) 132 Miss. 238, 96 So. 97; Davis v.
Modern Ind. Bank (1939) 279 N. Y. 405, 18 N. E. (2d) 639; McNeill v.
Chinn (1907) 45 Tex. Civ. App. 551, 101 S. W. 465; Mo. State Life Ins. Co.
v. Cal. State Bank (1919) 202 Mo. App. 347, 216 S. W. 785; Shay v. Merch.
Banking Trust Co. (Pa. 1939) 6 Atl. (2d) 536; Mente v. Townsend (1900)
68 Ark. 391, 59 S. W. 41; Mayer v. Ill. Life Ins. Co. (1918) 211 Ill. App.
285; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (1927) 248 Ill. App. 401; Atl. Life
Ins. Co. v. Gannon (1901) 179 Mass. 291, 60 N. E. 933; In effect this case
is overruled, sub silento, by Goldman v. Moses (1934) 287 Mass. 393, 191
N. E. 873; Bland v. Bland (1920) 212 Mich. 549, 180 N. W. 445; Farracy
v. Parry (1928 Tex. C. C. A.) 12 S. W. (2d) 651 (dictum); Schade v.
Western Union Life Ins. Co. (1923) 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac. 521 (dictum).
But see dictum contra, Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Sutter (Wash.
1940) 95 P. (2d) 1014, 125 A. L. R. 1089.
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to alter the respective rights of the parties between themselves
by an election to recognize the claim of the assignee over that
of the named beneficiary. Consequently, payment to the assignee
will not discharge the insurance company from liability on the
contract to the beneficiary. Likewise, the more common act of
interpleader, occurring under these circumstances, will have no
effect on the beneficiary's vested interest. Interpleader will not
be taken as an effective election on the part of the insurer to
recognize the claim of the assignee or as a waiving of the fact
that notice of assignment was not received until after death of
the cestui que vie.
On the other hand, it has been noticed that some courts are
exceedingly liberal in permitting the beneficiary's interest to be
affected by acts of the cestui que vie not amounting to substantial
compliance, even though notice of those acts is not received until
after the latter's death. It is to be expected that after death such
courts will allow the company to waive notice of the assignment.
Payment of the benefit to the assignee in these circumstances
would discharge the liability of the company. Likewise, inter-
pleader would be construed as a waiver by the company of earlier
notice of the assignment; if there is a valid transfer by the
cestui que vie, the assignee will receive the benefit of the policy.
Only the broadest outlines of this picture have as yet been
filled in by the courts. Decisions, particularly in states permit-
ting a change of beneficiary without substantial compliance with
policy provisions, have been confined to the simple situation in
which notice of assignment is given to the company before death
of the cestui que vie, with scant dicta pointing out other possi-
bilities. There is a close relationship, however, between courts'
treatment of attempted change of benficiary and assignment.
Knowing the decisions of a court on the first point, one should
be able to predict its holding on the second point, following the
lines set forth in this paper.
J. J. THYsON
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